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 South Africa is considering introducing a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
 A phased-in tax of US$30 per ton can achieve national emissions reductions targets set for 2025.
 Ignoring all potential beneﬁts, the tax reduces national welfare by about 1.2 percent in 2025.
 Border carbon adjustments reduce welfare losses while maintaining emissions reductions.
 The mode for recycling carbon tax revenues strongly inﬂuences distributional outcomes.a r t i c l e i n f o
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South Africa is considering introducing a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Following a dis-
cussion of the motivations for considering a carbon tax, we evaluate potential impacts using a dynamic
economywide model linked to an energy sector model including a detailed evaluation of border carbon
adjustments. Results indicate that a phased-in carbon tax of US$30 per ton of CO2 can achieve national
emissions reductions targets set for 2025. Relative to a baseline with free disposal of CO2, constant world
prices and no change in trading partner behavior, the preferred tax scenario reduces national welfare and
employment by about 1.2 and 0.6 percent, respectively. However, if trading partners unilaterally impose
a carbon consumption tax on South African exports, then welfare/employment losses exceed those from a
domestic carbon tax. South Africa can lessen welfare/employment losses by introducing its own border
carbon adjustments. The mode for recycling carbon tax revenues strongly inﬂuences distributional out-
comes, with tradeoffs between growth and equity.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
South Africa is amongst the world’s most carbon-intensive
economies. An abundance of coal resources and subsidized coal-
ﬁred electricity has led to a reliance on energy-intensive mining
and heavy industry as the historical drivers of economic develop-
ment. Notwithstanding this legacy, the South African government
has recently targeted ambitious reductions in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Emissions reductions at the scale envisioned im-
ply a structural transformation of the South African economy. The
government is considering introducing a carbon tax as one instru-
ment to foment this transformation [1].As with any major reform, there will be winners and losers from
a carbon tax, especially during the transition period. Inﬂuential
interest groups in South Africa have already expressed concerns
[2]. Businesses are worried about losing competitiveness, espe-
cially in export markets for minerals and metals. Organized labor
is concentrated in energy-intensive sectors and so labor unions
are worried about job losses. Finally, civil society groups are con-
cerned about the effect of higher energy prices on poor households.
These concerns underpin the current broad resistance in South
Africa to a carbon tax [3]. The challenge then for the South African
government is not only to design and implement an effective car-
bon tax, but also to strike a careful balance between energy, devel-
opment and environmental goals.
This article evaluates the socioeconomic consequences of intro-
ducing carbon taxes in South Africa as a Pigouvian measure de-
signed to reduce carbon emissions. The analysis employs a
recursive dynamic economywide model of South Africa that in-
cludes a detailed treatment of the energy sector calibrated to the
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mizing model. The economic model’s high level of disaggregation
permits an assessment of not only growth implications, but also
employment and distributional outcomes. The latter are major fac-
tors shaping the carbon tax debate in carbon-intensive developing
countries [4]. The model contains a novel treatment of industrial
energy use efﬁciency that accounts for changes in energy prices,
as well as changes in sectoral investment and capital vintages. This
better reﬂects the adjustment costs and investment constraints
that affect industries’ ability to adopt more energy efﬁcient tech-
nology [5,6]. The paper therefore contributes to the literature on
carbon taxation in developing countries and to the methods used
to measure its impacts.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the
motivations for considering a carbon tax in the South African con-
text, and Section 3 reviews the existing literature focused on South
Africa and highlights the knowledge gaps that this article seeks to
ﬁll. Section 4 provides an overview of energy use and CO2 emis-
sions from energy, and Section 5 describes the energy-related fea-
tures of the economywide-energy model. The next three sections
discuss results from the model, including the baseline, carbon
tax, and revenue recycling scenarios. The ﬁnal section summarizes
and concludes.2. Motivations for a carbon tax
Given that global climate change negotiations seem to have
stalled and that there is, as a consequence, no immediate interna-
tional pressure on South Africa to limit emissions, it is worthwhile
to reﬂect on why the country would pursue mitigation policy.
There are at least two reasons. First, Sokolov et al. [7] estimate that,
without global mitigation and compared with the end of the 20th
century, there is a 50 percent chance that global temperatures will
rise by ﬁve degrees Centigrade or more by 2100. The chance of a
rise of less than two degrees is nil. As Weitzman [8] notes, the con-
sequences of such extreme global warming are deeply uncertain
and may be profoundly negative. Despite this uncertainty, there
is broad consensus that low income countries will be affected ﬁrst.
Africa is vulnerable, given its underdevelopment and location in
the tropics. While South Africa is better equipped to adapt to cli-
mate change than many African countries, its neighboring states
are less robust. Overall, there are strong reasons to believe that
Africa’s long-run interests, including those of South Africa, favor
effective global mitigation.1
A second reason for introducing a carbon tax is that other na-
tions, notably Australia and the European Union but also China,
are taking climate change seriously. Australia, for example, cur-
rently imposes a carbon tax at a value of about US$20 per ton. Even
the United States has shown some willingness to enact mitigation
policies – the House of Representatives passed a ‘‘cap and trade’’
bill (effectively a carbon tax) in 2010, but this failed to gain ap-
proval in the Senate. It is possible that, over the coming decade,
mitigation policies could be implemented in a number of leading
countries. For these policies to be effective, this ‘‘coalition’’ of mit-
igating countries will have incentives to expand membership. They
may ﬁnd it logical and politically expedient to limit the ‘‘carbon
leakage’’ that arises when carbon-intensive supply-chains are relo-
cated to non-coalition countries. Border carbon adjustments (BCA)
that impose taxes on the carbon content of imports (and rebate
domestic exporters) are one potential instrument for achieving this
objective [9].1 Not only would implementing a carbon tax support the emergence of globa
policy, but it would also serve to cement South Africa’s position as a leader on the
continent.lIn summary, South Africa has a long-run incentive to support
global mitigation. In the shorter run, South Africa cannot discount
the possibility of the emergence of a coalition of mitigating coun-
tries that implements policies, such as BCAs, that would disadvan-
tage carbon intensive economies, such as South Africa, in global
markets. Implementing carbon taxes in the near term would serve
to initiate the transformation to a ‘‘greener’’ economy and hence
avoid having to rapidly reduce emissions in the future. In all cases,
the economic impacts of a carbon tax on the South African econ-
omy are of considerable interest. In this article, we explore these
economic impacts and consider the alternative carbon tax designs
being debated in the country.
The South African government has considered various instru-
ments to reduce carbon emissions. In the 2012 National Budget,
the government outlined a phased-in emissions-based carbon
tax, which, given concerns over adjustment costs, provides exemp-
tions to highly trade-exposed and energy-intensive industries.
These exemptions would delay but not stop the full imposition of
carbon taxes. The government therefore appears to be committed
to a gradual introduction of carbon taxes. That being said, while
some interest groups, particularly business, view a cap-and-trade
scheme as preferable, the complexity of managing such a system
makes a carbon tax a more immediately viable instrument and
thus the main focus of the policy debate.
The level of carbon tax needed for South Africa to achieve its
emissions reduction targets remains unclear given the absence of
empirical evidence. The government has also not speciﬁed how
carbon tax revenues would be recycled, since it is not standard
practice to earmark speciﬁc revenue sources for particular invest-
ments or social programs. Nevertheless, the policy debate is
broadly characterized by civil society, who advocate subsidizing
energy prices for poor households, and at the other extreme, busi-
ness groups, who generally support accelerated depreciation of
capital assets to allow for more energy-efﬁcient investments. In
this article we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by examin-
ing different carbon tax levels and revenue-recycling options.3. Existing literature and knowledge gaps
We are not the ﬁrst to explore these issues in the South African
context. Three recent studies use computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models to evaluate the potential effects of a carbon tax
[10–12]. Devarajan et al. [10] ﬁnd that carbon taxes reduce na-
tional welfare but are more efﬁcient than other tax instruments
on energy use or pollution. Through detailed sensitivity analysis,
the authors show that their results depend crucially on labor mar-
ket rigidities and technological substitution possibilities. One lim-
itation of the study is that the authors do not distinguish between
different energy technologies or capture the long-term electricity
investment plan for South Africa, which largely determines the fu-
ture energy mix and includes a shift towards renewable energy.
The study might therefore overstate the responsiveness of electric-
ity production and prices to the carbon tax. In contrast, Pauw [11]
distinguishes between energy technologies and bases long-term
electricity investments on a partial-equilibrium energy model.
Pauw ﬁnds smaller welfare reductions when a carbon tax is intro-
duced, although less attention is paid to labor market rigidities.
Van Heerden et al. [12] concentrate on revenue recycling options.
They ﬁnd that a ‘‘triple dividend’’, implying decreased CO2 emis-
sions and poverty while increasing GDP, is possible if revenues
from environmental taxes are recycled such that they reduce food
prices.
Perhaps the main limitation of these studies is the lack of a time
dimension. They use static CGE models, which exclude changes in
investment behavior in response to energy prices. Their static
Table 1
Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use, 2005a. Source: [2].
Total Coal Crude oil Natural gas
Domestic production (CO2 mt) 479.8 472.8 0.0 7.0
Plus imports 43.8 3.6 37.6 2.5
Total supply 523.6 476.4 37.6 9.5
Less exports 137.1 137.1 0.0 0.0
Less change in stocks 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
Domestic supply 387.8 340.6 37.6 9.5
Direct domestic use 387.8 340.6 37.6 9.5
Electricity 205.8 205.3 0.0 0.5
Petroleum 120.2 80.1 37.6 2.5
Other industries 52.0 45.5 0.0 6.5
Households 9.7 9.7 0.0 0.0
a Includes CO2 emissions from burning primary fuels but excludes other GHGs.
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tries and so understate adjustment costs. In a real world dynamic
setting, capital typically becomes immobile after investment,
implying that new investment is needed to shift production and
employment towards less carbon-intensive activities. Moreover,
none of the studies allow industries to invest in less energy-inten-
sive technologies. Efﬁcient mitigation policies are implemented
over time, allowing the carbon intensive capital stock to depreciate
away and providing clear signals to investors and innovators to
take carbon emissions into account. For these reasons, South Afri-
can emissions targets focus on 2025. Considering the path to
achieving these emissions reductions forms an important part of
the analysis.
To address these limitations, we develop a dynamic CGE model
of South Africa. Following Pauw [11], our model contains detailed
energy technologies and is calibrated to investment projections
from an energy sector model. Our dynamic speciﬁcation allows
non-energy industries to endogenously invest in more energy-efﬁ-
cient technologies in response to higher energy prices. The model
is calibrated to a purpose-built database that reconciles energy
and economic data. We simulate various policy options, including
carbon taxes; foreign and domestic BCAs; and various revenue
recycling options, similar to van Heerden et al. [12]. As with Dev-
arajan et al. [10], we conduct sensitivity analysis on labor market
rigidities.
The implications of BCAs merit further mention. BCAs are the
subject of a recent study by Energy Modeling Forum that is sum-
marized in Böhringer et al. [13]. In the study, BCAs are found to re-
duce carbon leakage and reduce output losses associated with
same level of emissions reductions. This article contributes to this
emerging literature by considering BCAs in a middle income
country.
4. Energy use and carbon emissions in South Africa
4.1. Sources of GHG emissions
South Africa has committed to reducing its GHG emissions by
34 percent by 2020 and 42 percent by 2025 relative to a ‘‘busi-
ness-as-usual’’ baseline [1]. Such ambitious targets reﬂect South
Africa’s ranking as the world’s thirteenth largest GHG emitting
country in absolute terms in 2007, with per capita emissions nearly
twice the global average [14].
Arndt et al. [2] compile an emissions proﬁle for South Africa
using information from national supply-use tables and energy bal-
ances. Table 1 describes the sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions from burning primary fossil fuels (i.e., coal, crude oil and
natural gas).2 Had South Africa burned its entire fossil fuel supply
in 2005 it would have generated 523.6 million metric tons of CO2
emissions. However, more than a quarter of coal is exported, imply-
ing that the CO2 emissions of net domestic supply are lower at 387.8
million tons. Despite these exports, coal still accounts for 87.8 per-
cent of net emissions, followed by crude oil at 9.7 percent.
More than three-ﬁfths of domestic coal supply is used to gener-
ate electricity. In 2005, coal-ﬁred power plants generated 92.9 per-
cent of total electricity supply, followed by nuclear (4.9 percent)
and hydropower (1.8 percent). This reliance on coal-ﬁred plants
explains why 53.1 percent of South Africa’s total emissions are
from electricity generation. Coal is further used to produce liquid
fuels, where it generates an additional 31 percent of total emis-
sions. Natural gas is used to produce electricity and liquid fuels,
although the quantities are relatively small and it contributes little
to total emissions. The remaining 16.2 percent of coal and 68.42 We use standard carbon emissions factors equal to 1.93 tons of CO2 per metric
ton of coal, 2.33 per metric ton of crude oil, and 0.056 per gigajoule of natural gas.percent of natural gas that are not transformed into electricity or
liquid fuels are used directly by industries and households.
Table 1 showed the emissions associated with the direct use of
primary fuels. However, all industries generate emissions indirectly
by using carbon embodied within intermediate inputs. Arndt et al.
[2] estimate carbon intensities for products and ﬁnd that indirect
carbon use accounted for two-thirds of total emissions in 2005, of
which approximately a quarter is carbon embodied within im-
ported goods and services. Not surprisingly, energy products are
found to be the most carbon intensive, with electricity and petro-
leum generating 3.29 and 0.66 tons of CO2 per 1000 Rand
(US$160) of ﬁnal demand, respectively. Carbon intensity is also rel-
atively high for the more export-intensive heavy industries, such as
wood products (0.37) and metals (0.40). Carbon use tends to be
lower in services, such as government (0.08) and ﬁnance (0.03). Ser-
vices do, however, use carbon indirectly, especially in the form of
electricity. The carbon-intensity of electricity generation therefore
has economywide implications beyond the energy and heavy
industrial sectors.
4.2. Long-term electricity investment plan
South Africa recently announced its electricity sector invest-
ment plan for 2010–2030 [15]. The plan draws on an energy sector
model which estimates least-cost investment options subject to
various constraints, including demand forecasts, portfolio risks,
domestic production quotas, and emission targets. Fig. 1 shows re-
sults from three simulations that satisfy the same demand forecast.
The ‘‘business-as-usual’’ scenario is unbounded by carbon taxes
or emission targets. Under this scenario, CO2 emissions in the elec-
tricity sector rise from 237 million tons in 2010 to 381 million tons
in 2030. The total cost of the ‘‘business-as-usual’’ plan (in present
value terms) is estimated at R0.79 trillion (US$108 billion), which
is equivalent to a third of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010.3
The least carbon-intensive investment plan in DOE [15] still fails
to achieve the national emission reduction targets. In the ‘‘low
emissions’’ scenario, total CO2 emissions only reach the targeted
42 percent decline from baseline by 2030 rather than 2025. Even
this delayed achievement incurs a substantial ﬁnancial cost to the
economy, with the ‘‘low emissions’’ investment plan costing
R1.25 trillion (US$171 billion). This implies that, given domestic
production quotas and demand forecasts, meeting the national
emissions targets in the electricity sector will cost the economy at
least an additional R0.46 trillion (US$63 billion) or 19 percent of
GDP in 2010. Much of this additional cost is due to greater use of
renewable energy, which has lower load factors and therefore re-
quires more installed system capacity in order to deliver the same
electricity output as coal-ﬁred and nuclear alternatives.3 The present value calculation uses an eight percent discount rate for the period
010–2030.2
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Fig. 1. Electricity system capacity in the energy sector model scenarios, 2005–2030. Source: Authors’ calculations using [15]. (All three scenarios supply the same electricity
demand forecast after accounting for differences in load factors.)
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passed on to consumers through higher electricity tariffs. However,
recent tariff increases suggest that any sizable pass-through will
face political economy constraints [3,16]. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the South African government has endorsed a more
modest investment plan.4 The total cost of this ‘‘revised baseline’’
scenario is well below the cost of the ‘‘low emissions’’ scenario.
However, total CO2 emissions in 2025 are only 19 percent below
the baseline and so fall far short of the 42 percent target. This implies
that, if future electricity production follows the revised baseline sce-
nario, as is currently expected, then any remaining emission reduc-
tions would need to occur outside of the electricity sector. This
special dispensation or ‘‘ring fencing’’ poses an important constraint
because the electricity sector accounts for a large share of total emis-
sions. For this reason, we initially calibrate our economywide model
to replicate the revised baseline, and then use this as our reference
scenario for evaluating the effects of carbon taxes on reducing the
remaining emissions.5 The vintage capital approach recognizes that technological change is often5. Economywide-energy model
Our CGE model is well-suited to evaluating a carbon tax. The
model contains detailed information on sectors and households.
It captures the functioning of a market economy in which the
interactions of producers, households, government and rest of
the world are mediated via prices and markets. Macroeconomic
and resource constraints are respected, which is crucial for large-
scale policy changes. And, the model is dynamic, which is impor-
tant for policies, such as carbon taxes, that are phased in over time
and meant to inﬂuence investment patterns. Overall, it provides a
‘‘simulation laboratory’’ for quantitatively examining how carbon
taxes inﬂuence production, trade and employment patterns as well
as income distributions.
The model is structured in the tradition of Dervis et al. [17]. De-
tailed descriptions of the modeling framework can be found in
Appendix A. Here, we limit discussion to dynamics, embodied
technical change in energy efﬁciency, and the energy subsectors
in the model. Simulation design and closure rules are presented
in the next section.
5.1. Dynamics
The model is recursive dynamic. Between periods, exogenous
variables and parameters are updated based on externally-deter-
mined trends in labor supply, government consumption, foreign4 This ‘‘policy-adjusted scenario’’ is an outcome of government and private sector
consultations.
embodied in new capital goods. This is also true for energy efﬁciency. For example, a
trucking company can become more energy efﬁcient by replacing older trucks with
new trucks. The average efﬁciency of the trucking company is driven in large measure
by the age, or vintage, of their trucks.capital inﬂows, and technical change. In addition, capital stocks in
period t + 1 are augmented based on investment in period t less
depreciation. This new capital is allocated across productive sec-
tors in proportion to a sector’s share of current capital stocks ad-
justed by its own proﬁt rate relative to the national average
proﬁt rate. Sectors with above-average proﬁt rates receive a great-
er share of investible funds than their share in the existing capital
stocks. Once allocated, capital remains ﬁxed in the sector. This
‘‘putty-clay’’ speciﬁcation implies that new capital is mobile but in-
stalled capital is sector-speciﬁc.
5.2. Embodied technical change in energy efﬁciency
The model presumes that technical change in energy efﬁciency
must come embodied in new capital investment. Furthermore,
improvements in energy efﬁciency must be induced through high-
er relative prices for energy. Our speciﬁcation is motivated by a
vintage capital approach to capital accumulation.5 Speciﬁcally, be-
tween periods non-energy producers can respond to changing en-
ergy prices by investing in more or less energy-intensive capital
and production technologies. This is shown below:
iojetþ1
iojet
¼ 1 1 P
qje
st
ps
0
@
1
A  SKjt  Nt
Kjt
where the change in the intermediate demand coefﬁcient, io, in sec-
tor j for energy commodity e at time t depends on changes in energy
market prices P relative to base year energy prices p. A sector’s
responsiveness to changes in energy prices depends on an elasticity
of substitution, q, and the share of new investment (SKjt  Nt) in the
sector’s existing capital stock K. This speciﬁcation implies that new
investment (or newer ‘‘vintage’’ capital) is required for a sector to
adopt less energy-intensive technologies. Slower growing and less
proﬁtable sectors will ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to adjust to higher en-
ergy prices.
5.3. Energy subsectors
Our model includes a detailed treatment of the energy sector.
As described earlier, the three primary fossil fuels, i.e., coal, crude
oil and natural gas, are either transformed into electricity and
petroleum or are used directly by ﬁnal users, i.e., industries and
households. Our model disaggregates electricity and petroleum
Natural gas
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Government
Fig. 2. Structure of the energy sector in the CGE model.
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Coal and natural gas are used to produce electricity. Other
sources include nuclear, hydropower (domestic and imported)
and renewables (i.e., solar and wind). Each electricity subsector
supplies their output to the national grid, where it is combined into
a single electricity commodity. Each subsector has its own produc-
tion technology, i.e., intermediate input coefﬁcients io and shares
in value added across factors. These technologies are based on
Pauw [11] and StatsSA [18]. The coal-ﬁred electricity subsector
gradually switches to cleaner coal technology based on projections
from DOE [15]. Finally, coal and natural gas are used to produce
petroleum via ‘‘coal-to-liquid’’ (CTL) and ‘‘gas-to-liquid’’ (GTL)
transformation processes. However, more than 80 percent of
petroleum is still produced by reﬁning imported crude oil.6 The growth elasticity of employment is higher than in other emerging markets
ut is consistent with South Africa’s experience during 2003–2008.
7 We tax fossil fuels at their point of entry into the economy, i.e., imported fuels
rude oil) are taxed at the border, and domestic fuels (coal and natural gas) are taxed
t the mine-head.6. Baseline scenario
We ﬁrst construct a baseline scenario that excludes carbon
taxes. The purpose of the baseline scenario is to provide a reason-
able counterfactual with which to assess the implications of alter-
native carbon tax designs. In the following, we ﬁrst present key
assumptions in the baseline path and then consider the implica-
tions of these assumptions. Because economic growth in the CGE
model is determined by labor and capital supplies and technical
change, these elements are in focus. An exception is the electricity
subsectors, whose production paths follow the ‘‘revised baseline’’
projections in Fig. 1 (using load factors to translate capacity into
output). This includes employment in the electricity sector, which
rises from 103,800 workers in 2005 to 174,000 workers in 2030.
The productivity and employment-intensity of individual electric-
ity subsectors are ﬁxed over time and so total employment and
technological change in the overall electricity sector is determined
by the pattern of electricity supply and is the same across the base-
line and carbon tax scenarios.
In labor markets, given South Africa’s skills constraints, we as-
sume that secondary and tertiary-educated labor supplies are
exogenous and fully employed and grow at 2.0 and 1.5 percent
per year, respectively. To reﬂect high unemployment amongst
low-skilled workers, we assume that the supply of primary-edu-
cated and uneducated workers is determined endogenously by
an upward-sloping supply curve with modest real wage-supply
elasticities. We assume wage-supply elasticities of 0.1 for all labor
types, which, in the baseline, generates a total employment growth
to GDP growth elasticity of 0.67. This is consistent with observed
national growth and employment trends in South Africa over the
last two decades. Given the uncertainty about future labor marketbehavior, we conduct sensitivity analysis on labor market rigidities
by considering lower (0.05) and upper (0.3) bound elasticities.
Elasticities close to zero suggest that unemployment is primarily
‘‘structural’’ and that labor market adjustments occur mainly
through (negotiated) movements in real wages [10]. The upper
bound elasticity implies that employment levels and wages re-
spond to changing labor demands.
Investment and capital accumulation rates are determined by
the level of savings. Since marginal savings rates are ﬁxed, private
savings are determined endogenously by private incomes. We as-
sume that foreign and public savings grow at roughly the same rate
as national economic growth and thus remain a ﬁxed share of total
GDP in the baseline. These assumptions imply a ﬂexible exchange
rate and public consumption growth of three percent per year
(consistent with current exchange rate and public consumption
growth policies). Technical change is captured by exogenous TFP
growth of one percent per year in all sectors.
The above assumptions lead to average annual GDP growth of
3.9 percent during 2010–2025, which is consistent with the
growth rate used to forecast electricity demand [15]. Economic
growth (and hence electricity demand) grows faster than electric-
ity supply, causing real electricity prices to rise initially. These
prices eventually stabilize and begin declining as the growth in
electricity supply accelerates. Total labor employment grows at
2.6 percent per year, implying an employment-growth elasticity
of 0.67 and a gradual decline in the national unemployment rate
(given annual population growth of 1.5 percent).6 GDP growth is
fairly even across sectors as a result of uniform productivity growth
and mobile labor. Overall, the baseline scenario provides a reason-
able economic trajectory for South Africa.7. Carbon tax scenarios
We now introduce carbon taxes while maintaining all other
assumptions. The resulting counterfactual simulations are com-
pared to the baseline scenario. We simulate three carbon tax sce-
narios. The ﬁrst simulation imposes a domestic carbon tax on the
net supply of primary fossil fuels.7 A carbon tax of US$3 (R21) per
ton of CO2 is introduced in 2012 and this rises gradually until it
reaches US$30 per ton in 2022. We call this the ‘‘production’’ sce-
nario because the tax is imposed on all domestically-produced
goods. For now, all carbon tax revenues are recycled through a uni-
form percentage point reduction in indirect sales tax rates for all
products.
The second simulation not only imposes a phased-in US$30 per
ton carbon tax on fossil fuel supplies, but it also introduces an
equivalent phased-in BCA that taxes imports and rebates exports
based on embodied carbon. For the calculation of export rebates,
we use the estimates of embodied carbon for the South African
economy calculated in Arndt et al. [2] multiplied by the value of
the carbon tax. For the calculation of import taxes, we should, in
principle, employ estimates of embodied carbon by commodity
and by bilateral trading partner. As this information is not available,
we simply apply the South African estimates from Arndt et al. [2].
These coefﬁcients would tend to overstate, on average, the actual
carbon content of imports due to South Africa’s overall high carbon
intensity. However, other than liquid fuels, South African imports
are not particularly carbon intensive. Imports from Europe, where
carbon intensity would be much lower than in South Africa, are
concentrated in products, such as capital goods, that have low car-b
(c
a
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embedded carbon content in Machinery, a major import item
sourced from Europe, is the lowest of any industrial sector. So,
while the true coefﬁcient on imports of European machinery is
likely to be lower, the absolute magnitude of the difference is small
because the coefﬁcients themselves are small.8 Imports from Asia,
particularly China, are reasonably well estimated by the South Afri-
can values as economy-wide carbon intensities are similar.
The BCA compensates domestic producers by maintaining their
import and export competitiveness even though trading partners
do not introduce their own carbon taxes. The BCA means that
South Africa only pays carbon taxes on consumed products, regard-
less of whether they are produced domestically or imported. We
therefore call this the ‘‘consumption’’ scenario. Again, we assume
that all carbon tax revenues, including revenues from BCAs net of
export rebates, are recycled through reduced indirect taxes.
The third simulation assumes that South Africa’s trading part-
ners introduce a carbon tax and BCA, but South Africa does not.
In this scenario, import prices that South Africa pays remain essen-
tially unchanged because the carbon tax applied in countries that
export to South Africa is rebated. However, export prices that
South Africa receives decline because at least some of the incidence
of the carbon tax imposed in the partner country accrues to South
Africa (and the revenue remains within the partner country).9
Again, we use South African coefﬁcients, but we set the foreign
BCA at half the value of the carbon tax imposed in the second simu-
lation. The BCA is phased-in from US$1.50 in 2012 to US$15 in 2022.
This is the ‘‘foreign carbon tax’’ scenario.
Table 2 shows the changes in CO2 emissions in the three simu-
lations. The table uses two metrics to measure carbon emissions.
The ‘‘reference’’ approach is based on fossil fuel supply, whereas
the ‘‘sectoral’’ approach accounts for the carbon embodied within
imports and exports. For example, the latter approach includes
the carbon within imported reﬁned petroleum, which only indi-
rectly uses crude oil. The former approach is consistent with a pro-
duction based tax (i.e., no BCAs), while the latter approach is
consistent with a consumption based tax. In the Production sce-
nario and using the reference approach, the phased-in US$30 per
ton carbon tax reduces total emissions by 36.6 percent relative to
the ‘‘business-as-usual’’ scenario. As discussed in Section 2, the re-
vised baseline scenario in DOE [15] projects a 19 percent reduction
in electricity sector emissions by 2025, which is equal to an 8.6
percent reduction in total emissions. The production-based carbon
tax therefore generates an additional 28 percentage point reduc-
tion in emissions, all of which comes from reduced carbon use in
the non-electricity sectors. In the consumption scenario and using
the sectoral approach, total emissions decline by 41.4 percent by
2025, which is close to the national target. Both approaches result
in similar total emissions reductions.10 Hence, the choice between a
production- and consumption-based carbon tax depends principally
upon economic impacts and political feasibility.
Table 3 presents macroeconomic results. A production-based
carbon tax reduces total absorption in 2025 by 1.2 percent below
the baseline GDP level in 2025.11 This implies a modest 0.08
percentage point reduction in the average annual absorption growth8 For example, suppose the true coefﬁcient on European machinery is two thirds o
the South African value. This would imply, for a R210 (US$30) per ton carbon tax, a
border carbon adjustment of one percent rather than 1.5 percent. These differentials
have essentially no impact on the reported results.
9 For a discussion of the terms of trade implications for developing countries o
BCAs implemented in developed countries, see [19].
10 The difference in percentage reduction is the result of differences in the
denominator. Because South Africa is a major net exporter of embodied carbon, the
production approach yields a larger denominator than the consumption approach.
11 Absorption is an aggregate welfare measure equal to the sum of private and
public consumption and investment.
12 This is partly a result of our savings-driven investment macroeconomic closure
which is justiﬁed by empirical evidence showing that changes in gross ﬁxed capita
formation in South Africa are caused by changes in the level of national savings, rather
than vice versa – see [20].f
frate during 2010–2025. This deceleration is mainly due to the effect
of falling national incomes and savings on investment.12 Private con-
sumption growth also decelerates, although this is offset by recy-
cling carbon taxes through lower indirect taxes, principally sales
taxes. Exports also decline with a production-based tax because pro-
ducers’ competitiveness is eroded in foreign markets. This prompts a
slight depreciation of the real exchange to support exports and dis-
courage imports.
In the production-based approach, the carbon tax puts pressure
on producers of traded goods because embodied carbon on imports
is not taxed and embodied carbon in exports is not rebated. In con-
trast, a consumption-based carbon tax rebates exports and taxes
imports making the implications for traded sectors unclear a priori.
In the event, the consumption-based tax heightens incentives to
produce for foreign markets resulting in a small increase in ex-
ports. Given a ﬁxed trade balance, imports increase as well. The
consumption-based tax maintains a higher level of employment
and does not push resources out of (often more productive) traded
sectors. As a result, the deceleration in absorption growth is smal-
ler under the Consumption scenario. A BCA therefore reduces the
economic losses of a carbon tax and addresses concerns raised
about a loss of export and import competiveness.
Labor demand declines with the introduction of a carbon tax
due to slower national economic growth. This is reﬂected in slower
employment growth for less educated workers and slower wage
growth for more educated workers. Overall employment in the
Production scenario is about 0.6 percent below the baseline in
2025. This implies a modest 0.04 percentage point reduction in an-
nual employment growth. As shown in Table 4, slower job creation
occurs in the more export- and carbon-intensive mining and heavy
industrial sectors, such as chemicals. This is offset by new produc-
tion and job opportunities in less carbon-intensive sectors, such as
food, textiles and ﬁnancial services. Fewer job losses occur in the
Consumption scenario because exporters and import-competing
producers are shielded by a BCA. The only exceptions are machin-
ery and transport, which rely on imported carbon-intensive inputs
that are now subject to the carbon tax, such as reﬁned petroleum.
Overall, the slowdown in job creation is relatively small, although
more unionized industrial sectors are most affected.
We conduct sensitivity analysis on the size of the carbon tax
and on labor market rigidities. The left-hand side of Fig. 3 shows
the ﬁnal GDP losses in 2025 at different carbon tax rates (i.e., an
economywide abatement cost curve), while the right-hand side
shows the sectoral sources of GDP losses. The abatement cost curve
is strongly non-linear and rises rapidly for carbon tax rates above
US$20 per ton. This is because the economy initially reduces emis-
sions at relatively low cost by focusing on the more carbon-inten-
sive sectors, such as mining. However, as carbon taxes rise, the
economy’s ability to further reduce emissions becomes more con-
strained, and eventually even less carbon-intensive sectors are af-
fected, such as services. Importantly, the electricity sector accounts
for half of total emissions and its future emissions path is ﬁxed.
This implies that any further emissions reductions have to take
place in non-electricity sectors, even if economywide abatement
costs are higher.
Employment losses are also more pronounced at carbon taxes
above US$20 per ton. The dashed lines in Fig. 3 shows results using
lower and higher labor supply elasticities (see Section 3). Not sur-
prisingly, the estimated number of job losses is sensitive to the va-
lue of these elasticities. For example, the decline in employment by
2025 for a US$30 per ton carbon tax ranges from 0.71 to 0.32 per-,
l
Table 2
GHG emissions results, 2010–2025a. Source: CGE model results.
Business-as-usual,
2010
Deviation from ‘‘business-as-usual’’ scenario, 2025 (%)
Revised
baseline
Production carbon
tax
Consumption carbon
tax
Foreign carbon
tax
Total CO2 emissions (mil mt) using the reference
approach
447.5 8.6 36.6 36.2 19.6
Electricity generation 237.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Other sectors/households 210.5 0.0 51.3 50.5 20.1
Total CO2 emissions (mil mt) using the sectoral
approach
397.4 8.6 40.4 41.4 21.0
a Includes CO2 emissions from burning primary fuels but excludes other GHGs. ‘‘Sectoral approach’’ includes the carbon embodied within imports and excludes carbon
within exports. We assume that exported fossil fuels are exempt in the production carbon tax scenario but imported fossil fuels are not.
Table 3
Macroeconomic results, 2010–2025. Source: CGE model results.
Initial value, 2010 Baseline growth rate (%) Deviation from baseline value, 2025 (%)
Production carbon tax Consumption carbon tax Foreign carbon tax
GDP at market prices (%) 100.0 3.91 1.23 1.07 1.00
Absorption 100.1 3.93 1.20 1.04 1.74
Household consumption 63.0 4.15 0.63 0.56 2.06
Percentile 0–50 11.3 2.56 0.78 0.79 1.74
Percentile 50–90 25.1 2.67 0.67 0.62 2.07
Percentile 90–100 26.6 2.59 0.52 0.40 2.17
Government consumption 19.2 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment demand 17.9 4.38 4.06 3.48 2.15
Exports 24.6 4.11 0.88 0.24 0.42
Imports 26.6 4.19 0.81 0.22 3.19
Employment (1000s) 12,244 2.63 0.56 0.50 0.83
High-educated workersa 5148 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low-educated workers 7096 3.16 0.90 0.80 1.32
Average wages (R per year) 74,303 2.72 1.37 1.20 1.90
High-educated workersa 116,709 4.11 1.97 1.73 3.11
Low-educated workers 43,538 0.89 0.92 0.80 0.39
a High-educated labor includes workers with completed secondary or tertiary educations.
Table 4
Sectoral employment results, 2010–2025. Source: CGE model results; carbon intensity measures from [2].
Employment share, 2010 (%) Carbon intensity measure, 2005a Deviation from baseline value, 2025 (%)
Production carbon tax Consumption carbon tax Foreign carbon tax
All sectors 100.0 0.265 0.56 0.50 0.83
Agriculture 3.7 0.138 1.54 0.21 0.47
Mining 7.4 1.661 5.43 3.74 2.03
Manufacturing 15.4 0.201 0.05 0.13 0.42
Food 2.7 0.154 1.05 0.41 0.89
Textiles 1.0 0.115 1.84 0.19 0.42
Wood products 2.2 0.372 0.83 0.63 0.79
Chemicals 2.0 0.422 0.61 0.05 0.83
Non-metals 0.8 0.312 1.09 1.02 1.13
Metals 2.3 0.396 0.22 0.95 0.25
Machinery 1.8 0.092 1.34 1.84 0.51
Vehicles 1.6 0.115 1.38 0.08 0.74
Other 0.9 0.145 1.79 0.65 0.65
Other industry 4.9 0.513 2.43 2.08 1.51
Services 68.6 0.162 0.12 0.13 0.80
Trade 17.4 0.194 0.30 0.21 1.04
Transport 6.5 0.171 0.60 0.89 0.48
Finance 6.1 0.031 0.19 0.10 0.63
Business 5.0 0.142 0.10 0.07 1.06
Government 20.6 0.080 0.19 0.17 0.43
Other 12.9 0.137 0.31 0.30 1.19
a ‘Carbon intensity’ is tons CO2 per R1000 (US$160) ﬁnal demand in 2005 prices.
350 T. Alton et al. / Applied Energy 116 (2014) 344–354cent under more or less elastic supply, respectively. Estimates of
GDP losses are far more robust – ranging from 1.04 to 1.07 percent
for a US$30 per ton carbon tax.The above discussion has focused on the impacts of domestic
carbon taxes. Should other countries unilaterally impose a carbon
tax on South African exports, in the absence of a domestic carbon
tax, it also causes South African emissions to decline (see Table 2).
Fig. 3. Economywide abatement costs and their sectoral sources, 2010–2025. Source: CGE model results. (The left hand side of the ﬁgure shows reductions in GDP,
employment and total emissions at different carbon tax levels (measured in US$ per ton of CO2). The right hand side of the ﬁgure shows in which sectors the decline in GDP
occurs. Emissions reductions are in addition to the 8.9 percent in the revised baseline scenario. The carbon tax is in 2005 prices and includes a BCA. Black dashed lines are GDP
results using lower (top) and upper (bottom) bound labor supply elasticities. Grey dashed lines are employment results for upper (top) and lower (bottom) bound elasticities.)
Table 5
Alternative revenue recycling results, 2010–2025. Source: CGE model results.
Deviation from baseline, 2025 (%)
Sales taxes Corporate taxes Social transfers
Total CO2 emissionsa 41.40 41.52 41.57
Total GDP 1.07 0.59 1.65
Absorption 1.04 0.58 1.61
Total employment 0.50 0.82 1.27
Average wages 1.20 1.97 3.48
Per capita consumption 0.56 0.62 0.87
Percentile 0–50 0.79 1.61 3.06
Percentile 50–100 0.51 0.41 1.71
a CO2 emissions are relative to ‘‘business-as-usual’’ and measured using the
sectoral approach. A consumption carbon tax is applied.
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Fig. 4. Per capita consumption changes under retaliatory taxes and revenue
recycling schemes. Source: CGE model results (Relative to a ‘‘no carbon tax’’
baseline. Revenues scenarios include a BCA. Feint dashed lines are results using
lower or upper bound labor supply elasticities.).
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and slower economic growth (see Table 3). As discussed above,
foreign BCAs reduce export prices for many of South Africa’s lar-
ger export sectors, causing the terms-of-trade to deteriorate sig-
niﬁcantly. Although the resulting real exchange rate
depreciation encourages less carbon-intensive exports, it also
raises the cost of import-intensive investment, which slows
absorption growth. More importantly, South Africa does not col-
lect revenues from foreign taxes. This means that falling private
consumption is not offset by recycled revenues. As a result,employment losses are larger because private consumption is
an important source of demand for labor-intensive products. Ulti-
mately, as modeled, the total absorption (welfare) losses from the
foreign carbon tax imposed outweigh those of a domestic carbon
tax. This supports concerns that international action to cope with
global warming may reduce South African competitiveness on
global markets and supports early action by South Africa to re-
duce its GHG emissions.8. Distributional effects and revenue recycling scenarios
The choice between alternative revenue recycling options pro-
foundly inﬂuences the distributional impacts of domestic carbon
taxes and can alter, though less dramatically, growth and employ-
ment outcomes. The simulations reported above assume that rev-
enues are recycled through a uniform reduction in indirect sales
tax rates. This is compared to two other options. First, we reduce
the corporate taxes imposed on the capital earnings of domestic
enterprises. Secondly, we scale up existing social transfer pro-
grams. In reality there are many alternative recycling options,
including targeted ‘‘green’’ investments in sectors that are heavily
affected by the carbon tax; or targeted energy subsidies for poor
households to offset higher energy prices. Although far from
exhaustive, our stylized scenarios are indicative of the range of
recycling options being proposed by business and civil society
groups in South Africa. In each scenario, we impose the same car-
bon tax (gradually increasing to US$30 per ton) with a BCA. Table 5
summarizes macroeconomic results for the recycling scenarios.
Note that the Sales Tax scenario replicates the earlier Consumption
scenario.
Each scenario generates emissions reductions that are broadly
consistent with the national target of a 42 percent reduction from
‘‘business-as-usual’’. Reducing corporate taxes leads to the small-
est reduction in total GDP and absorption. This is because enter-
prises are a major source of domestic savings in South Africa and
so reducing corporate taxes offsets the decline in investment. As
discussed in Section 3, the rate of capital accumulation determines
not only the growth rate but also the rapidity of the shift in pro-
duction towards less carbon-intensive sectors or energy-saving
technologies. Higher investment therefore accelerates both growth
and the adjustment process, which reduces absorption losses rela-
tive to the Sales Tax scenario.
352 T. Alton et al. / Applied Energy 116 (2014) 344–354Fig. 4 reports changes in per capita consumption for different
household income groups. Lowering sales taxes is almost distribu-
tional-neutral, as reﬂected by the nearly horizontal consumption
growth incidence curve (lower income households are slightly dis-
advantaged as can be conﬁrmed in Table 3). In contrast, house-
holds in the highest income percentiles are the main
beneﬁciaries of corporate tax reductions, because a larger share
of their income comes from capital earnings. This also generates
larger employment losses than in the Sales Tax scenario, because
high-income households consume more import- and capital-inten-
sive products. All household groups outside the top ﬁve percentiles
are worse off. Therefore, using all carbon tax revenues to reduce
corporate taxes dampens the decline in investment and economic
growth, but results in a more regressive welfare outcome.
Using carbon tax revenues to expand social transfers (based on
current allocations) leads to strongly progressive welfare out-
comes. This is shown in Fig. 4, where households in the bottom ﬁve
deciles beneﬁt from the carbon tax, whereas consumption falls for
higher income households. However, household savings rates in
South Africa are low, especially amongst low-income households.
Directing revenues towards these households consequently leads
to lower levels of aggregate savings and investment (see Table 5).
Analogous to the Corporate Tax scenario, lower investment slows
the adjustment process and worsens the deceleration of GDP and
absorption growth. Therefore, while carbon tax revenues can be
used to beneﬁt low-income households, this comes at the cost of
lower GDP, absorption (welfare) and employment.9. Discussion and conclusions
South Africa is considering using carbon taxes to reduce its high
levels of greenhouse gas emissions. There are concerns that this
will impose substantial adjustment costs on the economy, includ-
ing reduced export competitiveness, job losses and higher energy
prices. In this paper, we evaluate the socioeconomic consequences
of carbon taxes, including implications for economic growth,
employment and the distribution of household incomes. We ex-
tend previous impact assessments for South Africa by constructing
a dynamic economywide model that is linked to projections from
an energy sector model. Unlike previous studies, this study is dy-
namic; incorporates South Africa’s long-term electricity invest-
ment plan; captures rigidities in capital and labor markets; and
allows industries to invest in energy-saving technology.
A carbon tax of about US$3 per ton in 2012 rising linearly to
US$30 per ton by 2022 reduces emissions to targeted levels. In con-
sidering the welfare impacts of the tax, one challenge is to identify
an appropriate baseline scenario (counterfactual) that captures
what would occur if South Africa decided against the introduction
of carbon taxes. If the baseline scenario is characterized by free dis-
posal of emissions, constant world prices, and no behavior change
on the part of South Africa’s trading partners, then simulation re-
sults indicate that domestic carbon taxes reduce national income
and employment, although losses are smaller than previous
estimates.
However, these assumptions about the baseline may be inap-
propriate. Most obviously, this welfare analysis considers in detail
the economic costs of a carbon tax but ignores all beneﬁts from
reduced emissions. Less obviously, we ﬁnd that if South Africa’s
trading partners were to unilaterally impose carbon taxes with
BCAs resulting in a decline in South African terms of trade, the
resulting welfare losses could plausibly be as large as or larger
than those resulting from the imposition of a domestic carbon
tax. Under this baseline, a domestic carbon tax may increase na-
tional welfare.Across all scenarios, economic costs are small at low levels of
carbon taxes but increase though time as the level of the tax in-
creases. Economic costs are very mild in initial years but become
more pronounced at tax levels greater than about the US$20 per
ton level. The phased introduction of the tax over a ten year period
thus provides a window to implement, evaluate and adjust. Nota-
bly, we ﬁnd that BCAs that rebate exports and tax imports based on
carbon content reduce economic losses while delivering essentially
the same emissions reductions.
Growth and, in particular, distributional impacts are also found
to depend on how carbon tax revenues are recycled. In our princi-
pal scenario, revenues from carbon taxes are used to reduce indi-
rect sales taxes. This scenario is essentially distribution-neutral.
We compare reductions in indirect taxes with two additional op-
tions and discovered trade-offs. Reducing corporate taxes favors
economic growth and higher-income households, but the welfare
of most of the population deteriorates. Expanding social transfers
improves the welfare of low-income households but leads to larger
declines in national income. In addition, we test the robustness of
our ﬁndings to assumptions about labor market rigidities and tech-
nology substitution possibilities. This sensitivity analysis shows
that estimated employment losses depend on labor market
assumptions, but estimated national income and welfare losses
are more robust.
The agenda for future research is large. We consider only six
areas. First, the appropriate baseline or counterfactual is impor-
tant and merits further scrutiny. For example, in the absence of
global climate policy, future fossil fuel prices are expected to be
higher and more volatile. The baseline could incorporate the risks
from continued dependence on fossil fuels. Second, as mentioned,
we use estimates for BCA rates from Arndt et al. [2] which are
generated using South Africa’s supply-use tables. These estimates
should be reﬁned based on the country-speciﬁc energy and indus-
trial technologies of trading partners. Third, more detailed analy-
sis is needed to identify the optimal combination of revenue
recycling options, including a political economy assessment. Fur-
thermore, other recycling options were not considered, such as
accelerated depreciation allowances, public-funded research into
cleaner energy-saving technologies, and targeted energy subsidies
for low-income households. Fifth, although we allowed industries
to adopt energy-saving technologies, the analysis would beneﬁt
from ﬁrm- and sector-level estimates of marginal abatement
costs.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the emissions reduc-
tions in South Africa’s electricity investment plan may be inconsis-
tent with national emissions targets. Our analysis shows that
preferential treatment for the electricity sector places considerable
pressure on the non-electricity sectors to reduce their emissions.
The current investment plan is based on estimated abatement
costs within the electricity sector. However, further work is needed
to determine whether the investment plan would change if eco-
nomywide abatement costs are considered. Moreover, taking great-
er advantage of regional energy options, such as hydropower,
might reduce South Africa’s abatement costs. It might also reduce
the need for large carbon taxes and assist South Africa in transi-
tioning to a low-carbon development path.Appendix A
A.1. Consumer and producer behaviour
The model disaggregates households into 14 representative
groups based on their per capita incomes. Each representative con-
sumer maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint using a lin-
ear expenditure system (LES) of demand:
T. Alton et al. / Applied Energy 116 (2014) 344–354 353Pj  Hjh ¼ Pj  cjh þ bjh  ð1 sh  tdhÞ  Yh 
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j0
Pj0  cj0h
0
@
1
A ðA1Þ
where H is consumption of good j by household h, c is a minimum
subsistence level, b is the marginal budget share, P is the market
price of each good, Y is total household income, and s and td are
marginal savings and direct tax rates. The LES functions allow in-
come elasticities to vary across household groups based on esti-
mates from [21].
Similarly, producers maximize proﬁts subject to input and out-
put prices. A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
determines output quantity A from sector j:
Aj ¼ aj  ðdj  Lqjj þ ð1 djÞ  K
qj
j Þ
1=qj ðA2Þ
where a reﬂects total factor productivity (TFP), L and K are labor and
capital demands, and d and q are share and substitution parame-
ters. Maximizing proﬁts subject to Eq. (A2)gives the factor demand
equations:
Lj
Kj
¼ r  Zj
W
 1 dj
dj
 1=ð1þqjÞ
ðA3Þ
whereW is the labor wage and r is a ﬁxed economywide capital ren-
tal rate adjusted by a sector-speciﬁc distortion term Z. The factor
substitution elasticity is a transformation of q. Higher elasticities
mean that producers can more readily substitute between labor
and capital when relative prices change. Although not shown, the
South African model differentiates between four education-based
labor categories.
Leontief technology determines intermediate demand. Fixed in-
put–output coefﬁcients iojj0 reﬂect the quantity of good j0 used to
produce one unit of good j. These technical coefﬁcients are drawn
from [2] and [22]. The producer price PA is the sum of factor and
intermediate payments per unit of output
PAj  Aj ¼ W  Lj þ r  Zj  Kj þ
X
j0
Pjiojj0 ðA4ÞA.2. International trade and carbon taxes
Imperfect substitution exists between domestic goods and
goods supplied to and from foreign markets. A constant elasticity
of transformation (CET) function determines the relationship be-
tween the quantity of domestically supplied goods D and exported
goods E:
Aj ¼ pj  ðrj  Dljj þ ð1þ rjÞ  Eljj Þ
1=lj ðA5Þ
PAJ  Aj ¼ PDj  Dj þ PEj  Ej ðA6Þ
where PD and PE are domestic and export prices. Similarly, a CES
function deﬁnes the relationship between domestically produced
goods D and imported goods M:
Qj ¼ sj  ðuj  D
kj
j þ ð1þujÞ M
kj
j Þ
1=j ðA7Þ
ð1 tsjÞ  Pj  Qj  tc  cdj ¼ PDj  Dj þ PMj Mj ðA8Þ
where Q is the composite supply good, PM is the import price, and ts
is the sales tax rate. The parameter tc is the carbon tax value that is
multiplied by the quantity of carbon cd embodied within primary
fossil fuels, i.e., cd is a direct measure and so is only non-zero for
coal, crude oil and natural gas. By imposing carbon taxes on the
composite good Q, we assume that exported fossil fuels are exempt
but imports are not. Import substitution and export transformation
elasticities are from [23].Minimizing PAjAj  PDjDj  PEjEj and maximizing PQjQj  PDjDj -
 PMjMj subject to Eqs. (A5) and (A7), respectively, gives the ratios
of D, E and M in Eqs. (A9) and (A10):
Dj
Ej
¼ rj
1 rj 
PDj
PEj
 1=ðlj1Þ
ðA9Þ
Dj
Mj
¼ uj
1uj
 PMj
PDj
 !1=ð1þkjÞ
ðA10Þ
Import prices PM and export prices PE are determined by world
prices pwm and pwe and by the exchange rate X. World import
prices are adjusted for import tariffs tm. Although not shown, the
South African model also includes transaction costs on imported,
exported and domestically supplied products. Transaction costs
generate demand for trade and transport services and are subject
to carbon taxes.
PMj ¼ ð1þ tmjÞ  pwmj  X þ tb  cij ðA11Þ
PEj ¼ ðpwej  tr  ðcdj þ cijÞÞ  X  tb  cij ðA12Þ
Domestic BTAs tb are based on indirect carbon measures, i.e., on
the carbon within the intermediate inputs used to produce the ﬁ-
nal product. A domestic BTA causes import prices to rise depending
on their carbon content, which is calculated assuming that domes-
tic and import technologies are similar (see [2]). A domestic BTA
also causes export prices to rise through rebates. When trading
partners introduce their own carbon tax with a BTA equal to tr,
then South Africa’s import prices remain unchanged but export
prices fall (i.e., foreign exporters receive rebates but domestic
exporters are taxed in foreign markets). Foreign BTAs affect all ex-
ported products based on their direct and indirect carbon content
(i.e., cd + ci).
The current account balance is the difference between total ex-
port earnings and import payments and, while not shown, net for-
eign factor payments and transfers. Our macroeconomic closure
allows the exchange rate X to adjust to maintain a ﬁxed level of for-
eign savings F (i.e., foreign capital inﬂows).X
j
pwej  Ej þ F ¼
X
j
pwej Mj ðA13ÞA.3. Government and investment demand
Assuming all factors are owned by households, total income Y is
given by
Yh ¼
X
j
ðx W  Lj þ h  r  Zj KjÞ þ sth ðA14Þ
where st are social transfers from the government, and coefﬁcients
x and h determine the distribution of factor earnings to individual
households. The South African model also includes enterprises that
earn the returns to capital and use these proﬁts to pay corporate
taxes, save and pay dividends to households.
The government is treated as a separate institution. Total reve-
nue is the sum of direct and indirect taxes, including carbon taxes
and BTAs, as shown on the left-hand side of Eq. (A15):X
h
tdh  Yh þ
X
j
tsj  Pj  Qj þ
X
j
tc  cdj  Qj þ
X
j
tb  cij  ðMj
 EjÞ
¼
X
j
Pj  G  gj þ
X
h
sth þ B ðA15Þ
Revenues are used to purchase goods G and make social
transfers st. Any remaining funds are (dis)saved, as shown on the
right-hand side of Eq. (A15). Our macroeconomic closure for the
354 T. Alton et al. / Applied Energy 116 (2014) 344–354government assumes that consumption spending is equal to base-
year quantities g multiplied by an exogenous adjustment factor G.
The recurrent ﬁscal balance B adjusts to equalize total revenues
and expenditures.
Our savings-driven investment closure implies that total invest-
ment adjusts to the level of total savings. This is shown below:X
h
sh  Y  hþ Bþ F  X ¼
X
j
Pj  I  ij ðA16Þ
where i is ﬁxed base-year investment quantities multiplied by an
endogenous adjustment factor I.
A.4. Factor and product market equilibrium
Total labor supply LS is determined by upward-sloping supply
curves that depend on the prevailing wage W, the base-year wage
w, base-year labor supply ls, and a wage-supply elasticity e. In equi-
librium, total labor supply LSmust equal the sum of all sector labor
demands L:
LS ¼ ls  W
w
 s
¼
X
j
Lj ðA17Þ
Unlike labor, which is mobile across industries, capital is sector-
speciﬁc. Both factor demand K and the rental rate r are ﬁxed (see
Eq. (A3)) and the distortion term Z adjusts to equate capital de-
mand and supply in each sector.
Finally, product market equilibrium requires that the composite
supply of each good Q equals private and public consumption and
investment demand. Market prices P adjust to maintain equilib-
rium. Producers’ abilities to pass-through carbon taxes to con-
sumer prices are moderated by demand’s response to higher
prices.
Qj ¼
X
h
Hjh þ G  gj þ I  ij ðA18Þ
Together, the above 18 sets of equations simultaneously solve
for the values of 18 sets of endogenous variables (i.e., A, PA, L, W,
Z, D, PD, E, PE,M, PM, Q, P, X, Y, I, H and B). The consumer price index
(CPI) is our numéraire.
A.5. Investment and capital accumulation
Our recursive dynamic model has distinct within- and between-
period components. The above equations specify the within-period
component. Between-periods, exogenous variables and parameters
are updated based on externally determined trends (i.e., labor sup-
ply LS, government consumption G, foreign capital inﬂows F, and
technical change a) and on previous period results (i.e., capital
accumulation K).
While not shown in Eqs. (A1)–(A18), each variable has a time
subscript t. Sector-level capital stocks K are determined endoge-
nously based on previous period investment. As shown below,
the quantity of new capital N is based on the value of investment
and the capital price PK (i.e., market prices P weighted by invest-
ment shares i). New capital is allocated to sectors after applying
a depreciation rate t and according to a capital allocation factor
SK (0 < SK < 1;
P
SK ¼ 1).
Nt ¼
X
j
ðPjt  It  itÞ  PK1t
Kjtþ1 ¼ Kjt  ð1 tÞ þ SKjt  Nt
SKjt ¼ SPjt þ SPjt  SRjt  ARtARt
 where SP is a sector’s current share in total capital stocks, SR is a
sector’s proﬁt rate (i.e., rZj), and AR is the average proﬁt rate.
New capital is allocated in proportion to a sector’s share of current
capital stocks adjusted by its own proﬁt rate relative to the national
proﬁt rate. Sectors with above-average proﬁt rates receive a greater
share of investible funds than their share in the existing capital
stocks. This ‘putty-clay’ speciﬁcation implies that new capital is mo-
bile but installed capital is sector-speciﬁc.
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Glossary
Absorption: Economywide spending for consumption, investment, and government.
Absorption is also equal to gross domestic product (GDP) plus imports minus
exports.
Border carbon adjustments: A tax on imports and a rebate exports based on
embodied carbon.
